Benjamin took his life as he felt the Nazi’s close in on him as he fled to Spain. The Nazi invasion of France had been relatively smooth, but TheLeedsArcadesProject would like to look in a little more depth at what drove the Nazi desire for War. History has passed down to us a number of possible reasons, but TheLeedsArcadesProject will examine this issue once again.
1936, and Hitler had swept to power spectacularly with the peaceful resolution of the Rhineland crisis. This mood of national exhilaration was to be short lived however. Ian Kershaw tells us that “the worries and complaints of daily life returned soon enough. Worker discontent about low wages and poor work conditions, farmer resentment at the ‘coercive economy’ of the Food Estate, the grumbling of small tradesmen about economic difficulties and ubiquitous consumer dissatisfaction over prices continued unabated” (Kershaw, 2000, p.xxxvi). Nazi policies needed to address the economy and this they did in a radical way.
GETTING THE ECONOMY BACK ON ITS FEET
Over the next few years the Nazi party restructured the economy to facilitate its military rearmament.
They did this by a program of government spending and public investment with the intention of stimulating demand and expanding income. By 1937 this strategy had led to a situation whereby “there was work again. The economy was booming. What a contrast this was to the mass unemployment and economic failure of Weimar democracy” (Kershaw, 2000, p.28). Most Germans supported Hitler at this time, indeed saw him as a saviour simply because what they saw was “millions of people began to find jobs again and earnings grew steadily while the cost of living did not. After what seemed like years of weak and uncertain government, Hitler was conveying the impression that there was a steady eye and firm hand at the helm again.”(Gellately, 2001, p.260) Indeed there is agreement amongst commentators that the German economy recovered faster and to a higher level than in the rest of Europe. According to Overy the purpose of this economic recovery was to fulfil Hitler’s ambitions of “German imperialism and war”(Overy, 1982,p.61). The German economy was been prepared for military expansion, this would become much more apparent in 1936 with the Four Year Plan. The Nazi’s did more than just provide employment in armaments factories, they also reduced the burden of taxation on farmers, supported the construction industry and embarked on an ambitious road building scheme. By 1937 full employment was reached.
The Nazi approach to economy seems to have had no definite plan, as the leaders tried to mould the economy to their ideological requirements. Full employment was therefore important to get the country to support them and also to get the armaments industry working again. The party tried to control most as much of the economy as they could, they attempted to regulate trade, finance, and investment and labour relations.
HEADED TOWARDS ECONOMIC CRISIS
This situation was not to last as the economy began to flounder.
Unfortunately “as the pressures of an increasingly armaments-orientated economy laid bare the mounting shortages of labour and raw materials, the attractiveness of expansion became all the more evident.” (Kershaw, 2000, p.xiv). Hitler’s rearmament program had already led to full employment, a factor which made him very popular, but he had succeeded too well and was now faced with labour shortages. With full employment there was plenty of money floating around for consumer goods so now both the consumer market and the armaments industry were competing for workers and investment. Hitler favoured the armaments industry but had to keep the German people happy, the only way to do this was ultimately to plunder other countries.
That Hitler was ideologically motivated is clear but it seems that to an extent he was also economically motivated aswell. For example in 1936 when he pledged his support to Franco in the Spanish civil war he was aware of the “potential for gaining access to urgently needed raw materials for the rearmament program” (Kershaw, 2000, p.14).
THE FOUR YEAR PLAN
Hitler introduced The Four-Year Plan in 1936 which firmly established Nazi economic policy on the country and pushed the economy in the direction of expansion and war. The economy was restructured for war preparation including “Self-sufficiency in essential war materials-oil, rubber and steel.” (Overy, 1982,p.61) Hitler’s ideology and the country’s economic policy were now completely linked.
ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA
In 1937 Hitler annexed Austria to Germany and again ideological reasons were not his exclusive motivation; “the significant material resources that would accrue to Germany’s economy, hard-pressed in the push to rearm as swiftly as possible under the Four Year Plan, were the key determinants in the take-over” (Kershaw, 2000. P.66). Austria’s raw materials, particularly its Iron ores, made it an economically important country.
THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
By 1938 Hitler and his leaders were “casting greedy eyes on the raw materials and armaments plants of Czechoslovakia. The problems built into the economy so heavily tilted towards armaments production but still heavily dependent upon costly imports of food and raw materials, facing too an increasingly acute labour shortage, and with an agriculture sector strained to the limit, ere –as countless reports indicated-mounting alarmingly. The economic pressures for expansion accorded fully with the power-political aims of the regimes leadership” (Kershaw, 2000, p.89).
Hitler’s full scale invasion of Czechoslovakia was prevented by the Munich agreement with the leading European leaders which ceded the Sudetenland to Germany. Hitler seems to have been rather annoyed that the agreement prevented a full scale war, “’That fellow Chamberlain has spoiled my entry into Prague’, he was overheard saying on his return to Berlin after the agreement at Munich.” (Kershaw, 2000, p.164). Of course Hitler took the rest of Czechoslovakia in due course but it would seem that his thoughts were for war as early as 1938. The Munich agreement had confirmed in his mind that he could do what he wanted in East Europe and France and Britain would not interfere.
Hitler was committed to the reintegration of all German territories taken away after the First World War (at the Versailles treaty). “He wanted to right the wrong of the Versailles treaty”(Rees, 1997). “Hitler’s whole understanding of politics revolved around the experiences of German defeat in the first World War.”(Vogel, 1993,p.ix) The reacquisition of the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland could certainly be seen as part of this plan. Indeed the future allied powers operated a policy of appeasement towards these acquisitions but with his proposed (and eventual) invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia Hitler was showing his true colours. He was demonstrating that his intention was to make Germany the master of all Europe. To find living space for the German people and perhaps to wash away the stain of defeat left by 1918.
It is interesting to speculate that one of the reasons Hitler may have wished to invade Czechoslovakia may be to do with his childhood in Austria, where Czechs were disliked.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1939
With the territorial acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia Hitler had eased economic problems somewhat. The unemployed from these additions to the Reich were put to work, new skilled labourers were available as were new supplies of raw materials and armament factories. Still the economy was problematic, by early 1939, the national debt had tripled since Hitler had come to power, and still consumer demand was rising due to the armaments boom.
By 1939 the economic difficulties at home were becoming increasingly noticeable. Part of the problem was finance, “During 1938 the money supply grew much faster than output. The Government desire to increase war expenditure led to a continued expansion of the Reich debt and a growing diversion of resources away from the consumer sector. The competition for resources under conditions of full employment, rising world prices and raw material scarcity led to a veiled inflation that was only repressed by the government’s strict enforcement of wage and price controls.” (Overy, 1982,p62)
As more armaments were made and full employment was reached people had money to spend but fewer consumer goods to spend it on. The government used its control to keep workers for rearmament. This meant that there were fewer consumer goods so what there were charged at a higher price leading to inflation. ~General Thomas pointed out to Germanys leading economist is 1939 that “We shall never defeat England with radio sets, vacuum cleaners and cooking utensils”(Mason, 1993,p.199) The consumer industry was now competing with the armaments industry not just for currency but also for manpower.
The rearmament policy had become a threat to the domestic economy. As the regime tried to nullify this threat by limiting consumption and controlling the worker they at the same time were aware of the fact that they could not piss the people off too much.
According to Kershaw Hitler ignored the rumblings of discontent and focused on his plans for conquest, for Kershaw, “this reflected a key feature of Hitler’s thinking: war as panacea. Whatever the difficulties, they would be –and only could be-resolved by war.” (Kershaw, 2000, p.187). Hitler had always been inclined to visions of grandeur, indeed his early success in the Rhineland had persuaded him that he had a pact with destiny. By 1939 his Megalomania had reached new heights “he frequently compared himself with Napoleon, Bismarck, and other great historical figures. The rebuilding programs that constantly preoccupied him were envisaged as his own lasting monument-a testament of greatness like the buildings of the Pharaohs or Caesars. He felt that he was walking with destiny. Such a mentality allowed little space for the daily worried and concerns of ordinary people. It was much the same when Schacht or Goring brought the deteriorating economic situation to his attention. Such problems were, in his view, a mere passing phenomenon, a temporary irritant of no significance compared to the grandeur of his vision and the magnitude of the struggle ahead. Conventional economics-however limited his understanding-would, he was certain, never solve the problems. The sword alone, as he had repeatedly advocated since the 1920’s, would produce the solution: the conquest of the ‘living space’ needed for survival.” (Kershaw, 2000, p.188) And it would be Eastern Europe and then Russia that would provide that living space.
POLAND
In 1939 Hitler turned to Poland. At first he used the German claim on Danzig and the corridor as an excuse, still saying that he just wanted to unite all German nationalists. With the return of the Polish territories “the whole Versailles Treaty is annulled”(Overy and Wheatcroft, 1989,p.54). His intention was for a total invasion of Poland in order to gain its raw materials, access to the Baltic Sea and to use its captive population as a cheap form of labour. England and France could not countenance German dominance of Poland and declared war. In the short term this didn’t stop Hitler for taking control of Poland with his new allies, Russia, the hated enemy. Hitler also signed a treaty with Russia whereby Russia would supply Germany with raw materials in exchange for various goods. Both countries “while milking the Polish land and people and appropriating grain and minerals wherever they could, immediately put into practice long-held colonisation plans, the Russians importing thousands of Soviet families, the Nazis-both more ambitious and far better organised-hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans, mostly farmers.” (Sereny, 1995, p.211).
It is important to note that Hitler did not expect England and France to go to war over Poland. He expected them to try to appease him as they had done in Czechoslovakia. For this reason alone it is a moot point to suppose that he expected war in 1939. Or is it he was seeking it in 38 in Czech.
WHY DID HITLER LEAD GERMANY TO WAR?
For Kershaw “Economic pressures did not force Hitler into war. They did not even determine the timing of the war. They were, as we have noted, an inexorable consequence of the political decisions in earlier years” (Kershaw, 2000, p.162). For Kershaw Hitler’s focus on rearmament and his rejection of international trade (Germany needed to be as self sufficient as possible during the coming war) were part of preparing the economy for war, which for Hitler was inevitable for ideological reasons.
Alan Bullock argues that Hitler “meant to turn the energies and tension of the German people outwards and create a racist empire in the east at the expense of the Slav untermenschen (‘sub-humans’), with the psychological satisfaction as well as the material advantages of a Herrenvolk (‘master-race’). This programme was plainly set out in ‘Mein Kampf’ published in the mid-1920’s. Until he could carry out the rearmament to which he gave overriding priority, he had to lull suspicions abroad and keep the support of the conservative-nationalist forces in Germany. There was no timetable or blueprint of aggression; Hitler was both a gambler and an opportunist.”(Bullock, 1997,p.75)
Bullock sees the person of Hitler as paramount to the war. Without Hitler events would not have emerged as they did, “In such a situation, I believe it is possible for an individual to exert a powerful, even a decisive influence on the way events develop and the policies which are followed.” (Bullock, 1997,p.81) For Bullock the extraordinary circumstances of the time provide an opportunity for extraordinary individuals like Hitler to exert a dramatic (and in this case, Catastrophic) effect on the world. Germany’s war with the rest of Europe was inevitable then as the master race spread out.
Overy claims that “it is impossible to view Nazi policies for the economy in isolation. They form a unit inseparable in the end from the political and ideological purposes of the regime”(Overy, 1982,p.66) Overy places Hitler’s motivation in his personality, in this man who wanted to see “German domination in Central Europe”(Overy and Wheatcroft,1989,p.36) and reverse the judgement of Versailles. Overy looks very carefully at Hitler’s pre-WW1 life in Austria where he formed him hatred of Marxism and Judaism. Hitler here formed his view that what explained the course of history was not class struggle or national rivalries but the struggle for dominance between races, social Darwinism. War for him was a natural outcome of this competition between races.
Overy also places great importance on the notion of ‘Lebensraum’, living space. Hitler believed that living space was of key importance to a world power. Overy sees the war as very much a product of Hitler’s outlook “There can be little doubt that the world view outlined in ‘Mein Kampf’ shaped in all kinds of ways the choices Hitler made” (Overy and Wheatcroft,1989,p.30)
Hitler was aware of economic factors in Overy’s view. He recognises that the Nazi leaders knew they had to recognise the “importance of increasing German economic and political influence in Eastern and Central Europe where there were large resources of labour, land and raw materials.” (Overy and Wheatcroft, 1989,p.41) But Overy asserts that the economy was aimed at war preparation from the start. The Four year plan was deliberately intended to ready Germany for war with Russia at some time in the early 1940’s. “The timetable for the great war in the 1940’s was built into the rearmament plans.”(Overy and Wheatcroft, 1989,p.46)
So war was inevitable but why then according to Overy did war break out in 1939? He sees Hitler as having become bold as a result of his successful territorial acquisitions thus far so that when he made claims in Poland he thought that, just like at Munich, Britain would back off allowing him further preparation time for the inevitable showdown. Hitler believed that Britain and France were not as strong willed as Germans. The thought that democracy had made them weak. When Britain declared war, Hitler was reportedly “at a loss.” (Overy and Wheatcroft, 1989,p.60)
This is not to deny that for Overy and economic situation in 1939 had contributed to some degree to Hitler’s decision to make territorial demands in 1939. Even if he didn’t think war would actually be declared he may still have been persuaded by the economic situation to make his demands in Poland at that time.
Tim Mason is a commentator who’s “theoretical model is recast to allow for the primacy of politics over structural economic interests and antagonisms.” (Vogel, 1993,p.viii) That is for Mason the party controlled all social activity. Mason places primacy on the issue of the economic crisis, for him the pressures of an accelerating domestic crisis pushed the regime into the gamble of a premature war. “In a situation where the economic preparations for a sustained war effort lagged behind strategic requirements and where the policies aimed at the pacification of Germany’s working class had demonstrably failed, the pre-emptive strike of a war of territorial expansion and plunder offered the only escape route.”(Vogel,1993,p.xii) Mason see’s the Nazi regimes relationship with the working class as been of paramount importance, he claims that the working class refused to collaborate with the regime by acts of non-cooperation such as disruptive behaviour in the workplace.
Mason’s view see’s the workers as having a better bargaining position as with full-employment and yet still a deficit of workers in armament the workers could demand better conditions and wages. For Mason the dynamic between the Nazi party and the working class was paramount to Hitler’s decision to go to war in 1939. “The armaments sector had for quite some time been at a point where increased capacity could only be achieved at the expense of other branches of the economy-branches that had themselves profited from the armaments –led boom. It was high time for a planned redistribution of resources to replace an economic policy that had been basically interested in maximising productivity in all sectors simultaneously. The alternative was territorial expansion, which meant solving the problem at the expense of other countries and peoples.” (Mason, 1993, p.203)
